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1
INTEREST OF AMICI1
Amici are scientific, clinical, and voluntary
organizations in the field of intellectual disability.

THE
AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION
ON
INTELLECTUAL
AND
DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES (“AAIDD”) (formerly named the
American Association on Mental Retardation),
founded in 1876, is the nation’s oldest and largest
organization of professionals in the field of
intellectual disability.
Through its professional
journals, conferences, and book publishing, AAIDD
works diligently to advance scientific understanding
of intellectual disability.
Primarily focused on
clinical, psychological, scientific, educational, and
habilitative issues, the Association also has a
longstanding interest in legal issues that affect the
lives of people with intellectual disability. AAIDD
has appeared as amicus curiae in this Court in a
variety of cases involving mental disability, including
cases as diverse as City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), and Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
AAIDD has
This brief was written entirely by counsel for amici, as
listed on the cover. No counsel for either party authored this
brief in whole or in part, and neither counsel for a party nor any
party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the
preparation or submission of this brief. No person other than
the members of the organizational amici or their counsel made
a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of
this brief. All parties have filed notices of consent to the filing
of amicus curiae briefs in support of either party, or neither
party, with the Clerk’s Office.
1

2
formulated the most widely accepted clinical
definition of intellectual disability. Both as the
formulator of the clinical definition of intellectual
disability, and as an interdisciplinary membership
organization
concerned
with
maintaining
appropriate professional standards in the diagnosis
of intellectual disability, AAIDD and its members
have a strong interest in the manner in which Atkins
claims are evaluated by courts.

THE ARC OF THE UNITED STATES (“The
Arc”), founded in 1950, is the nation’s largest
community-based organization of and for people with
intellectual and developmental disabilities and
consists of nearly 700 state and local chapters across
the country. The Arc promotes and protects the
human and civil rights of people with intellectual
and developmental disabilities and actively supports
their full inclusion and participation in the
community throughout their lifetimes. Through its
National Center on Criminal Justice and Disability,
The Arc serves as a national clearinghouse for
information, training, and advocacy on the topic of
people with intellectual and developmental
disabilities involved in the criminal justice system.
The Arc has a vital interest in ensuring that all
individuals with intellectual and developmental
disabilities receive the protections and supports to
which they are entitled by law, and that courts and
administrative agencies employ commonly accepted
scientific principles for the diagnosis of intellectual
and developmental disabilities.
The Arc has
appeared as amicus curiae in this Court in a variety
of cases involving intellectual and developmental

3
disabilities, including Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304 (2002), and Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986
(2014).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
As with any field of scientific inquiry, our
understanding of the condition of intellectual
disability is improved and enhanced over time by
continuing, rigorous study and analysis.
The
scientific study and the diagnosis of intellectual
disability involve issues important to scholars and
clinicians. But amici believe that there is no need for
this Court to become enmeshed in the details and
intricacies of those scholarly efforts in order to
resolve the instant case and to provide guidance to
lower courts in their task of fairly adjudicating cases
under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). This
Court need only affirm that States must conform to
the basic framework of the clinical definition of
intellectual disability.
The clinical definition of intellectual disability
consists of three prongs.2 The first prong requires
impairment in intellectual functioning. This Court
made clear in Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014),
that States cannot artificially ration the number of
Atkins-eligible capital defendants by arbitrarily
rejecting universally accepted scientific principles in
evaluating test scores.

The third prong of the definition, regarding the age of
onset, is not at issue in this case.
2

4
The second prong requires deficits in adaptive
behavior.
As the Court observed in Hall,
“Intellectual disability is a condition, not a number.”
134 S. Ct. at 2001. Although the precise clinical
terminology has evolved over time, the core
principles about the interpretation of adaptive
deficits have been well settled among clinicians for
decades.
Central to this clinical consensus is
agreement that the inquiry must focus on deficits in
adaptive skills, and not some form of “balancing”
those deficits with supposed strengths that an
individual might appear to possess. Equally well
accepted is the fact that many individuals with
intellectual disability may also have other conditions
or disabilities (known as “co-morbidity” or “dual
diagnosis”) and those other conditions do not affect
the diagnosis of intellectual disability.
Texas has distorted the clinical definition’s
carefully
crafted
and
scientifically
tested
requirements for the second prong. It has devised a
formula of exclusionary “factors,” a formula that
rests heavily on stereotypes about people with
intellectual disability.
This approach is wholly
inconsistent with accepted scientific standards.
Deviating from the basic clinical framework of the
definition inevitably leads to inaccurate
and
unreliable results, and protects only a sub-set of
defendants with intellectual disability.
This deliberate decision to reject clinical
standards in the adjudication of death penalty cases
is inconsistent with this Court’s holdings, and
incompatible with the Eighth Amendment.

5
ARGUMENT
In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), this
Court held that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause of the Eighth Amendment forbids the
execution of any individuals who fall within the
clinical definition of intellectual disability (or,
previously, “mental retardation”).3 “Because of their
impairments, . . . by definition they have diminished
capacities to understand and process information, to
communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn
from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to
control impulses, and to understand the reactions of
others.” 536 U.S. at 318.4
The clinical definition of intellectual disability
consists of three requirements: reduced intellectual
functioning (as measured by IQ testing), deficits in
adaptive skills, and onset of the disability before
adulthood.5 In Hall v. Florida, this Court addressed
This Court has noted the change in terminology from
“mental retardation” to “intellectual disability.”
Hall v.
Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014).
3

See also Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1992 (“No legitimate
penological purpose is served by executing a person with
intellectual disability.
To do so contravenes the Eighth
Amendment, for to impose the harshest of punishments on an
intellectually disabled person violates his or her inherent
dignity . . . .” (citation omitted)).
4

American
Association
on
Intellectual
and
Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD), Intellectual Disability:
Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports 5 (11th ed.
2010) [hereinafter AAIDD, Manual 2010] (“Intellectual
disability is characterized by significant limitations both in
intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed
5

6
the implementation of the definition’s first prong 
the requirement of significant limitations in
intellectual functioning  and noted that the clinical
definition of intellectual disability is “a fundamental
premise of Atkins.” 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1999 (2014).6
This case involves the second prong of the
definition: the diagnostic requirement that an
individual
have
“significant
limitations . . . in
7
adaptive behavior.”
in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills.
This
disability originates before age 18.”); see also American
Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders 33 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5]
(“Intellectual disability (intellectual developmental disorder) is
a disorder with onset during the developmental period that
includes both intellectual and adaptive functioning deficits in
conceptual, social, and practical domains.”).
In the present case, the expert testimony makes clear
that Petitioner satisfies the first prong of the definition, Joint
Appendix at 17, 39, 73, 89, and the judge who heard the
testimony so found. Petitioner’s Appendix at 167a.
6

AAIDD, Manual 2010, supra note 5, at 5. Over the
years, the precise language used by professionals in the field to
describe the adaptive behavior (sometimes abbreviated as AB)
prong has varied somewhat, reflecting advances in clinical
understanding and practices. But these changes in terminology
have not affected the concept of adaptive behavior or altered the
category of individuals who are found to have significant
deficits. See id. at 11 (“[B]oth the definition of ID [intellectual
disability] and its operationalization have remained consistent
over time.”). State statutes also vary somewhat in their
terminology regarding adaptive behavior, having been adopted
at different times and incorporating language derived from
different iterations of the definition. All of these statutory
definitions are grounded in clinical understanding, and
encompass the same set of individuals.

7
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There is a substantial, consistent, and robust
body of clinical and scientific literature on the
meaning and application of this requirement.
Accurate and valid diagnoses must be informed by
that clinical understanding.

I.

The Clinical Requirement of Adaptive
Deficits.

For decades, the clinical definition of
intellectual disability has required a determination
that the individual has, in addition to limitations in
intellectual functioning, deficits in adaptive
This requirement reflects the
functioning.8
consensus among clinicians and professional
organizations in the field that “intellectual limitation
is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
mental retardation.”
Anne Anastasi & Susana
Urbina, Psychological Testing 248 (7th ed. 1997). The
purpose of this component of the definition is to
exclude from the diagnosis any individual whose low
scores on IQ testing is not accompanied by a
substantially disabling impairment of functioning in
See, e.g., American Association on Mental Deficiency,
Manual on Terminology and Classification in Mental
Retardation 11 (rev. ed. 1973) (“Mental Retardation refers to
significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning
existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior, and
manifested during the developmental period.” (emphasis
added)). For a discussion on the evolution of the adaptive
behavior component, see Kazuo Nihira, Adaptive Behavior: A
Historical Overview, in Adaptive Behavior and Its
Measurement: Implications for the Field of Mental Retardation
7, 7–14 (Robert L. Schalock ed., 1999).
8

8
life.9
Put another way, the adaptive behavior
requirement is designed to restrict the diagnosis of
intellectual disability to those individuals who, in
addition to their low IQ scores, also have an actual,
significant disability that affects their lives and
reduces their ability to function in society. See Hall,
134 S. Ct. at 1999 (These individuals have
“diminished capacities to understand and process
information, to communicate, to abstract from
mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in
See generally AAIDD, Manual 2010, supra note 5, at 43
(“Adaptive behavior is the collection of conceptual, social, and
practical skills that have been learned and are performed by
people in their everyday lives.”). The American Psychiatric
Association’s classification manual similarly requires:

9

[d]eficits in adaptive functioning that result in
failure to meet developmental and sociocultural
standards for personal independence and social
responsibility.
Without ongoing support, the
adaptive deficits limit functioning in one or more
activities of daily life, such as communication,
social participation, and independent living,
across multiple environments, such as home,
school, work, and community.
DSM-5, supra note 5, at 33. The American Psychological
Association recognizes the same diagnostic requirement. See
Keith F. Widaman & Kevin S. McGrew, The Structure of
Adaptive Behavior, in American Psychological Association,
Manual of Diagnosis and Professional Practice in Mental
Retardation 97, 97 (John W. Jacobson & James A. Mulick eds.,
1996) (“To be identified as having [mental retardation], a
person must exhibit both significantly subaverage intelligence
and deficits in adaptive behavior during the developmental
period.”); id. (“Adaptive behaviors are the behavioral skills that
people typically exhibit when dealing with the environmental
demands they confront.”).

9
logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to
understand the reactions of others.” (quoting Atkins,
536 U.S. at 318)). Thus, it excludes from the
diagnosis of ID people who are merely poor testtakers.10
Decades of scientific study and clinical
experience have produced a remarkable consensus on
several key issues relating to the proper diagnosis of
the second prong of the definition.

A. Stereotypes About People with Intellectual
Disability
There is a wide gap between the clinical
definition, on the one hand, and on the other,
expectations that many laypeople have about what
intellectual disability (or mental retardation) means.
Common mis-impressions include beliefs that people
with ID are essentially identical to one another, and
that all are incapable of any but the most
rudimentary tasks. The magnitude of that gap and
its consequences can be particularly problematic. As
a prominent leader in the field of intellectual
disability has observed:

See Daniel J. Reschly, Documenting the Developmental
Origins
of
Mild
Mental
Retardation,
16
Applied
Neuropsychology 124, 132 (2009) (“Even a very low score on a
single measure of general intellectual functioning is never
sufficient.”).
10

10
Most individuals with mental retardation
will have strengths and areas of ability.
These strengths may confound a
layperson or a professional with limited
clinical experience with individuals who
have mild mental retardation. These
laypersons may erroneously interpret
these pockets of strengths and skills as
inconsistent with mental retardation
because of their misconceptions regarding
what someone with mental retardation
can or cannot do.
Marc J. Tassé, Adaptive Behavior Assessment and
the Diagnosis of Mental Retardation in Capital
Cases, 16 Applied Neuropsychology 114, 121 (2009)
(citation omitted).11
Several authorities cited in this brief occasionally use
the term “mild” intellectual disability or mental retardation as
part of a mild/moderate/severe/profound taxonomy. The term
“mild” encompasses roughly 85–90% of people who are within
the clinical definition of ID, but almost certainly a much higher
proportion of Atkins cases. Marc J. Tassé, Adaptive Behavior
Assessment and the Diagnosis of Mental Retardation in Capital
Cases, 16 Applied Neuropsychology 114, 117 (2009); Gilbert S.
Macvaugh III & Mark D. Cunningham, Atkins v. Virginia:
Implications and Recommendations for Forensic Practice, 37 J.
Psychiatry & L. 131, 142 (2009) (“virtually all” Atkins cases).
See generally Martha E. Snell & Ruth Luckasson et al.,
Characteristics and Needs of People with Intellectual Disability
Who Have Higher IQs, 47 Intellectual & Developmental
Disabilities 220, 228 (2009). A principal reason why many
clinicians no longer use these diagnostic subcategories is
because the term “mild,” a euphemism, can be mistakenly read
to suggest that such people have only minimal impairments,
and thus the term understates the extent of their deficits. See
American Association on Mental Retardation, Mental
Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports
11

11
Such preconceived assumptions about what it
means for someone to have intellectual disability
often contrast sharply with the understanding of
professionals and clinicians in the field.12 Some of
these stereotyped notions are triggered by an
individual’s physical appearance,13 but many are also
34 (9th ed. 1992). In reality, everyone within that category
faces the same functional issues addressed by the Court in
Atkins and Hall. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002);
Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1993 (2014).
People with intellectual disability have been confronted
by popular misunderstandings and stereotypes throughout
history. See James W. Trent, Jr., Inventing the Feeble Mind: A
History of Mental Retardation in the United States 131–224
(1994). In the past, many of these stereotypes gave rise to
egregious legislation, particularly at the state level. For
example, a 1929 Michigan statute provided, “It is hereby
declared to be the policy of the state to prevent the procreation
and increase in number of feeble-minded, insane and epileptic
persons, idiots, imbeciles, moral degenerates, and sexual
perverts, likely to become a menace to society or wards of the
state. The provisions of this act are to be liberally construed to
accomplish this purpose.” Act of May 22, 1929, No. 281, § 1,
1929 Mich. Pub. Acts 689, 689–90.
12

See J. Gregory Olley, The Death Penalty, the Courts,
and Intellectual Disabilities, in The Handbook of High-Risk
Challenging Behaviors in People with Intellectual and
Developmental Disabilities 229, 231 (James K. Luiselli ed.,
2012) (“[T]he public generally misunderstands mild ID and
expects that such individuals are easy to identify by their
physical appearance, their speech, or other readily apparent
characteristics.”); Martha E. Snell & Ruth Luckasson et al.,
Characteristics and Needs of People with Intellectual Disability
Who Have Higher IQs, 47 Intellectual & Developmental
Disabilities 220, 220 (2009) (“Most of these individuals [in the
range of mild intellectual disability] are physically
indistinguishable from the general population because no
specific physical features are associated with intellectual

13

12
based on the public’s often uninformed expectations
about what people with intellectual disability
supposedly cannot do. There is a strong impulse to
conjure up our own image of what people with
intellectual disability are like, and then to evaluate
individuals by how closely they seem to resemble
that preconceived image of “a mentally retarded
person.”14
disability at higher [IQ levels].”); American Association on
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, User’s Guide:
Intellectual Disability: Definition, Classification, and Systems of
Supports 25–26 (2012) (“Physical appearance can also
contribute to stereotypes as reflected in the statement that ‘if
you don’t have the look (as in Down syndrome) then you are not
intellectually disabled.’ It should be noted that the vast
majority of persons with an ID have no dysmorphic feature and
generally walk and talk like persons without an ID.”).
See, e.g., Joanne Kersh, Attitudes About People with
Intellectual Disabilities: Current Status and New Directions, in
41 International Review of Research in Developmental
Disabilities 199, 220 (Robert M. Hodapp ed., 2011)
(“Additionally, a lack of familiarity with people with ID may
lead to a reliance on common misperceptions and stereotypes in
order to make judgments and decisions about individuals.”);
Marcus T. Boccaccini et al., Jury Pool Members’ Beliefs About
the Relation Between Potential Impairments in Functioning and
Mental Retardation: Implications for Atkins-Type Cases, 34 Law
& Psychol. Rev. 1, 18 (2010); Andrea D. Lyon, But He Doesn’t
Look Retarded: Capital Jury Selection for the Mentally
Retarded Client Not Excluded After Atkins v. Virginia, 57
DePaul L. Rev. 701, 712 (2008) (“Many mistakenly believe that
one can merely look at a person and tell whether he is mentally
retarded.”).
14

Stereotypes about intellectual disability are often based
on images of people with more severe or profound levels of
impairment than those individuals who are most frequently
encountered in capital cases.
See Daniel J. Reschly,

13
These lay assumptions sometimes include an
imagined “list” of things that people with intellectual
disability cannot do.
The activities that are
supposedly inconsistent with intellectual disability
can involve, for example, employment, social
relationships, reading and writing, and driving a car.
But the clinical literature is abundantly clear that
many of the people who have been properly
diagnosed with intellectual disability can perform
one or more of these tasks.15
Documenting the Developmental Origins of Mild Mental
Retardation, 16 Applied Neuropsychology 124, 125 (2009)
(“Death penalty appeals involving claims of MR . . . virtually
always involve [mild mental retardation].”); Macvaugh &
Cunningham, supra note 11, at 142 (“[V]irtually all [capital
offenders with mental retardation] are within the mild category
of mental retardation.”) (The Macvaugh and Cunningham
article is an outgrowth of the ad hoc committee on Atkins
evaluations within the section of the American Psychological
Association concerned with intellectual disability.).
See, e.g., Daniel J. Reschly, Documenting the
Developmental Origins of Mild Mental Retardation, 16 Applied
Neuropsychology 124, 133 (2009); Martha E. Snell & Ruth
Luckasson et al., Characteristics and Needs of People with
Intellectual Disability Who Have Higher IQs, 47 Intellectual &
Developmental Disabilities 220, 220–21 (2009); Roger J.
Stancliffe & K. Charlie Lakin, Independent Living, in
Handbook of Developmental Disabilities 429, 430 (Samuel L.
Odom et al. eds., 2007) (“Seminal studies have documented the
ability of many people with ID to live reasonably successfully in
the community with relatively modest formal support . . . .”
(citations omitted)); Gary N. Siperstein & Melissa A. Collins,
Intellectual Disability, in The Death Penalty and Intellectual
Disability 21, 26–29 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015); David
Mank, Employment, in Handbook of Developmental Disabilities
390, 392 (Samuel L. Odom et al. eds., 2007); Michael L.
Wehmeyer & Susan B. Palmer, Adult Outcomes for Students
with Cognitive Disabilities Three-Years After High School: The
15

14
The scholarly literature provides no support
for any such exclusionary list of everyday tasks
incompatible with a diagnosis of intellectual
disability. Nor is there such a list in the experience
of clinicians who deal with individuals with
intellectual disability every day.

B. The Diagnostic Focus on Deficits
The clinical definition of adaptive behavior has
long focused exclusively on adaptive deficits.16 As a
Impact of Self-Determination, 38 Education & Training in
Developmental Disabilities 131, 139–40 (2003); see also Robert
L. Schalock & Ruth Luckasson, Clinical Judgment 38–39 (2d
ed. 2014).
See, e.g., AAIDD, Manual 2010, supra note 5, at 1
(“significant limitations . . . in adaptive behavior”); DSM-5,
supra note 5, at 33 (“[d]eficits in adaptive functioning”);
American Psychological Association, Manual of Diagnosis and
Professional Practice in Mental Retardation 13 (John W.
Jacobson & James A. Mulick eds., 1996) (“[s]ignificant
limitations in adaptive functioning”); American Association on
Mental
Retardation,
Mental
Retardation:
Definition,
Classification, and Systems of Supports 5 (9th ed. 1992)
(“limitations in adaptive skills”); American Psychiatric
Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders 32 (3d ed. rev. 1987) (“[c]oncurrent deficits or
impairments in adaptive functioning”); American Association on
Mental Deficiency [now AAIDD], Classification in Mental
Retardation 11 (rev. ed. 1983) (“deficits in adaptive behavior”);
American Association on Mental Deficiency, Manual on
Terminology and Classification in Mental Retardation 11 (rev.
ed. 1973) (“existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive
behavior”); American Association on Mental Deficiency, A
Manual on Terminology and Classification in Mental
Retardation 3 (2d ed. 1961) (“[i]mpairment in adaptive
behavior”) (emphasis added in each quotation).
16

15
result, each diagnostic evaluation explores and
documents those things that an individual cannot do
in everyday life.17 In the absence of such practical

Clinicians have developed sophisticated and detailed
methods for objectively answering the question of what deficits
or limitations an examined individual may have.
These
methods include, but are not limited to, psychometric
instruments known as adaptive behavior scales. See AAIDD,
Manual 2010, supra note 5, at 47 (“Obtaining information from
multiple respondents and other relevant sources (e.g., school
records, employment history, previous evaluations) is essential
to providing corroborating information that provides a
comprehensive picture of the individual’s functioning.”);
American Association on Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities, User’s Guide: Intellectual Disability: Definition,
Classification, and Systems of Supports 18 (2012) (“The use of
multiple respondents, consistent with this standard, will ensure
greater reliability of the information obtained, and provide a
broader coverage of adaptive behavior across settings.”); DSM5, supra note 5, at 37. See generally Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct.
1986, 1994 (2014) (Evidence of AB deficits include “medical
histories, behavioral records, school tests and reports, and
testimony regarding past behavior and family circumstances.”).
17

It is worth noting that the diagnostic assessment of
deficits in adaptive functioning focuses on typical, everyday
functioning, and not on potential or maximum performance.
For clinicians, this is very different from the assessment of
intellectual functioning (Prong 1), which assesses maximum
performance. See, e.g., AAIDD, Manual 2010, supra note 5, at
47 (“This is a critical distinction between the assessment of
adaptive behavior and the assessment of intellectual
functioning, where best or maximal performance is assessed.”);
Macvaugh & Cunningham, supra note 11, at 162 (There is a
consensus among clinicians that “assessment of adaptive
behavior should measure a person’s typical or actual
performance, as opposed to knowledge of a skill or estimated
potential.” (citations omitted)).

16

The evaluation of “everyday functioning” raises
particular issues in prisons. Clinicians agree that prison
behavior is not a valid measure of an individual’s real-life
functioning.
While evidence of an inmate’s successful
adaptation to prison conditions can be probative evidence on
the separate and distinct issue of future dangerousness, and
therefore admissible in mitigation at capital sentencing, see
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 7 (1986), it is not
relevant to an Atkins case on the issue of whether the
defendant had deficits in adaptive behavior at the time of the
offense.
Caroline Everington et al., Challenges in the
Assessment of Adaptive Behavior of People Who Are
Incarcerated, in The Death Penalty and Intellectual Disability
201, 202 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015) (“[A] satisfactory
assessment of AB [adaptive behavior] is not possible in a prison
context because the individual has no opportunities to
demonstrate the presence or absence of adaptive skills typical
in day-to-day life. Inmates do not cook, choose clothing, or
make independent choices about their day-to-day existence. By
design, correctional settings remove virtually all personal
control from the individual, and, as such, practical behaviors
pertinent to the diagnosis cannot be demonstrated.”); DSM-5,
supra note 5, at 38 (“Adaptive functioning may be difficult to
assess in a controlled setting (e.g., prisons, detention centers)
. . . .”); Marc J. Tassé, Adaptive Behavior Assessment and the
Diagnosis of Mental Retardation in Capital Cases, 16 Applied
Neuropsychology 114, 119 (2009) (“The prison setting is an
artificial environment that offers limited opportunities for
many activities and behaviors defining adaptive behavior.”). In
the case at bar, the Court of Criminal Appeals clearly mandated
consideration of a defendant’s “conduct in a prison society.” Ex
parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). See
Ex parte Cathey, 451 S.W.3d 1, 26–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
Another difficulty that arises from an assessment of
prison behavior occurs when evidence is admitted in the form of
testimony by guards and other correctional officers. See, e.g., J.
Gregory Olley & Ann W. Cox, Assessment of Adaptive Behavior
in Adult Forensic Cases: The Use of the Adaptive Behavior
Assessment System-II, in Adaptive Behavior Assessment SystemII: Clinical Use and Interpretation 381, 386 (Thomas Oakland &

17
deficits, clinicians cannot diagnose the individual as
having intellectual disability. The clinician’s
diagnostic focus does not  and cannot  involve
any form of “balancing” deficits against the abilities
or strengths which the particular individual may
also possess.18
Framing the adaptive behavior prong solely in
terms of a person’s limitations was not an arbitrary
choice in the formulation of the definition of
intellectual disability. The diagnostician’s singular
focus on adaptive deficits (in contrast to balancing
strengths and weaknesses) might initially seem
counterintuitive to many laypeople. However, this
focus on deficits makes clinical sense in the
diagnostic process because the second prong’s
function is to ascertain whether the measured
Patti L. Harrison eds., 2008) (“[R]eports from corrections
officers or other observations of current functioning in prison
are not valid indicators of level of adaptive behavior.”);
Macvaugh & Cunningham, supra note 11, at 161 (“[A]n
assessment of a particular inmate’s adaptive behavior while in
a highly-structured prison environment has very limited
correspondence to the adaptive demands of the open
community, whether or not the offender’s adaptation is
compared with other inmates.”). And the problems that have
been noted, supra Section I.A., concerning stereotypes about
people with intellectual disability often arise when correctional
officers describe observed behavior as either consistent or
inconsistent with their own image of the functioning of a person
with intellectual disability.
In sharp contrast to the medical community’s
“diagnostic framework,” Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2000, the Court of
Criminal Appeals instructs lower courts to consider both
strengths and weaknesses. Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 489. See
Cathey, 451 S.W.3d at 27.
18

18
intellectual limitations (i.e., the first prong) are
accompanied by real-world limitations in the
individual’s life.19
This focus on adaptive deficits is essential to
the diagnostic process because clinicians universally
recognize that, in the lives of individuals with
intellectual disability, weaknesses in functioning
almost always co-exist with relative strengths. As
the AAIDD classification manual explains, the
finding of “significant limitations in conceptual,
social, or practical adaptive skills is not outweighed
by the potential strengths in some adaptive skills.”20
See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2001 (“Intellectual disability is a
condition, not a number.” (emphasis added)).
19

AAIDD, Manual 2010, supra note 5, at 47. This fact
has long been recognized and accepted by clinicians. See, e.g.,
American Association on Mental Retardation, Mental
Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports
5 (9th ed. 1992) (“Specific adaptive limitations often coexist
with strengths in other adaptive skills or other personal
capabilities . . . .”); see also Martha E. Snell & Ruth Luckasson
et al., Characteristics and Needs of People with Intellectual
Disability Who Have Higher IQs, 47 Intellectual &
Developmental Disabilities 220, 220 (2009) (“[A]ll individuals
with intellectual disability typically demonstrate strengths in
functioning along with relative limitations.”).
20

This Court has recognized this key aspect of the
definition of intellectual disability. See Brumfield v. Cain, 135
S. Ct. 2269, 2281 (2015) (“[I]ntellectually disabled persons may
have ‘strengths in social or physical capabilities, strengths in
some adaptive skill areas, or strengths in one aspect of an
adaptive skill in which they otherwise show an overall
limitation.’” (quoting American Association on Mental
Retardation, Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and
Systems of Supports 8 (10th ed. 2002))).

19
Clinical diagnostic standards focus exclusively
on deficits in adaptive functioning because
practically every individual who has intellectual
disability also has things that he or she has learned
to do, and can do.21 As a result, the existence of one
or more adaptive strengths cannot negate a
diagnosis of intellectual disability.22 The particular
functional impairments and adaptive deficits that
are experienced by individuals with intellectual
disability are not uniform across the class, and the

See, e.g., Caroline Everington, Challenges of Conveying
Intellectual Disabilities to Judge and Jury, 23 Wm. & Mary Bill
Rts. J. 467, 471 (2014) (“Interpretation of these findings
requires an understanding of typical behavioral expectations of
individuals who function in the mild range of ID. For example,
the presence of a defendant’s strengths in some areas, such as
having a history of steady employment or possessing academic
skills in the fourth to sixth grade range, is to be expected and
does not preclude a diagnosis of ID.”).

21

While it is often important for clinicians to identify and
assess a person’s strengths and skills for purposes of planning
and implementing future individualized educational and
habilitative programs, those strengths play no role in the
diagnostic determination of whether the person meets the
definition of intellectual disability. J. Gregory Olley, The Death
Penalty, the Courts, and Intellectual Disabilities, in The
Handbook of High-Risk Challenging Behaviors in People with
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities 229, 233 (James K.
Luiselli ed., 2012) (“[I]t is important to note that a clinical
evaluation emphasizes strengths in order to plan services that
capitalize upon those strengths to promote success.
An
evaluation for the court is focused on deficits because its
purpose is to determine a diagnosis, and an ID is, by definition,
a condition characterized by deficits.”).
22
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diagnostic standards cannot, and do not, require
such uniformity.23
This diversity among people who have
intellectual disability is often unknown to laypeople
with limited experience with the disability.
However, it is fully documented and well known to
clinicians in the field24 and thus must form the
backdrop for any legitimate diagnostic process.

C. Co-morbidity with Other Conditions
Many individuals who have intellectual
disability also have other mental or physical
disabilities.
Co-existing conditions (sometimes
referred to as “co-morbid” or “dual diagnosis”) can
arise in the evaluation process in some Atkins cases.
This phenomenon has long been recognized by
clinicians and mental health professionals.25

See id. (“[P]eople with mild ID are a heterogeneous
group with individual profiles of relative strengths and
weaknesses. One cannot argue that the presence of a particular
strength rules out ID, particularly if it is a strength shared
with others with ID.”).
23

See, e.g., AAIDD, Manual 2010, supra note 5, at 7
(“[P]eople with ID are complex human beings who likely have
certain gifts as well as limitations.”).

24

Under the heading of “Comorbidity,” the American
Psychiatric Association includes several forms of mental illness
frequently encountered in individuals who have intellectual
disability.
25

21

The most common co-occurring mental and
neurodevelopmental disorders are attentiondeficit/hyperactivity disorder; depressive and
bipolar disorders; anxiety disorders; autism
spectrum disorder; stereotypic movement disorder
(with or without self-injurious behavior); impulsecontrol disorders; and major neurocognitive
disorder. Major depressive disorder may occur
throughout the range of severity of intellectual
disability.
DSM-5, supra note 5, at 40. The clinical literature about comorbid depression in individuals with intellectual disability is
well established. See, e.g., Anton Dosen & Jan J. M. Gielen,
Depression in Persons with Mental Retardation: Assessment and
Diagnosis, in Mental Health Aspects of Mental Retardation:
Progress in Assessment and Treatment 70 (Robert J. Fletcher &
Anton Dosen eds., 1993); Sigan L. Hartley & William E.
MacLean, Jr., Depression in Adults with Mild Intellectual
Disability: Role of Stress, Attributions, and Coping, 114 Am. J.
Intellectual & Developmental Disabilities 147 (2009); Lauren
Charlot et al., Mood Disorders, in Diagnostic Manual–
Intellectual Disability: A Textbook of Diagnosis of Mental
Disorders in Persons with Intellectual Disability 271–316
(Robert Fletcher et al. eds., 2007).
There is also abundant clinical evidence about the
heightened vulnerability of some individuals with intellectual
disability to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). See, e.g.,
Daniel J. Tomasulo & Nancy J. Razza, Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder, in Diagnostic Manual–Intellectual Disability: A
Textbook of Diagnosis of Mental Disorders in Persons with
Intellectual Disability 365, 368 (Robert Fletcher et al. eds.,
2007) (“In addition to lower intellectual levels, people with ID
[intellectual disabilities] have higher rates of many additional
factors known to increase vulnerability to PTSD, such as early
separation from parents (through early institutionalization or
hospital admissions), lower educational levels, less training and
preparation for negative life events (training and preparation
that might have increased the individual’s sense of personal
control), and limited capacity for garnering social support.”);
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The fact that an individual who has
intellectual disability also has another mental
condition or mental illness does not alter the
diagnostic process. In particular, co-morbidity does
not preclude a clinical determination that the
individual has deficits in adaptive behavior that
satisfy the second prong of the definition.26 There is
Ludwik S. Szymanski & Maija Wilska, Childhood Disorders:
Mental Retardation, in 1 Psychiatry 687, 718 (Allan Tasman et
al. eds., 2d ed. 2003); Ruth Ryan, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
in Persons with Developmental Disabilities, 30 Community
Mental Health J. 45, 46 (1994) (“People with developmental
disabilities are more likely than nondisabled persons to be
abused physically, emotionally, or sexually.”); Chrissoula
Stavrakaki & Yona Lunsky, Depression, Anxiety, and
Adjustment Disorders in People with Intellectual Disabilities, in
Psychiatric and Behavioural Disorders in Intellectual and
Developmental Disabilities 113, 119 (Nick Bouras & Geraldine
Holt eds., 2d ed. 2007) (“One major cause of PTSD in these
individuals are high rates of physical and sexual abuse.”).
The phenomenon of dual diagnosis has also been noted
by this Court. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S.
581, 593 (1999) (“Respondents L. C. and E. W. are mentally
retarded women; L. C. has also been diagnosed with
schizophrenia, and E. W. with a personality disorder.”);
Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2280 (2015) (“[T]he
diagnosis should be made . . . regardless of and in addition to
the presence of another disorder.” (quoting American
Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders 47 (4th ed. text rev. 2000)), (citing American
Association on Mental Retardation, Mental Retardation:
Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports 172 (10th
ed. 2002)).
Using the possible existence of a co-morbid mental
illness in an individual to alter or preclude an otherwise-valid
diagnosis of intellectual disability is incompatible with accepted
clinical practice. See, e.g., J. Gregory Olley, The Death Penalty,
the Courts, and Intellectual Disabilities, in The Handbook of
26
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High-Risk Challenging Behaviors in People with Intellectual
and Developmental Disabilities 229, 232 (James K. Luiselli ed.,
2012) (“An understanding of dual diagnoses is important
because it may be mistakenly argued in court that the
defendant has a mental illness diagnosis that rules out mental
retardation.”).
In this regard, it is important to note that the definition
of intellectual disability does not contain a requirement that the
deficits in adaptive behavior (Prong 2) be caused by the deficits
in intellectual functioning (Prong 1). See, e.g., AAIDD, Manual
2010, supra note 5, at 1 (“Intellectual disability is characterized
by significant limitations both in intellectual functioning and in
adaptive behavior . . . .”); DSM-5, supra note 5, at 33
(“Intellectual disability (intellectual developmental disorder) is
a disorder with onset during the developmental period that
includes both intellectual and adaptive functioning deficits in
conceptual, social, and practical domains.”). Nor have earlier
iterations of the definition contained a requirement of causation
between the first and second prongs. See, e.g., American
Association on Mental Deficiency, Manual on Terminology and
Classification in Mental Retardation 11 (rev. ed. 1973) (“Mental
Retardation refers to significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in
adaptive behavior, and manifested during the developmental
period.” (emphasis added)).
Although no formulation of the definition has ever
required proof that the intellectual impairment caused the
deficits in adaptive functioning, some versions have used the
term “related” in reference to the two prongs. See DSM-5,
supra note 5, at 38 (“[T]he deficits in adaptive functioning must
be directly related to the intellectual impairments . . . .”);
American Association on Mental Retardation, Mental
Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports
5 (9th ed. 1992) (“existing concurrently with related limitations
in . . . adaptive skill areas . . . .”). But when it has been
included, the term “related” has always required only a
relatively minimal connection. Id. at 6 (“The limitations in
adaptive skills are more closely related to the intellectual

24
no reason, nor do we have a methodology, to
somehow “separate out” the effects of multiple
conditions. Neither the accuracy nor the consistency
of Atkins adjudications are enhanced by inviting
witnesses — or triers of fact — to guess about the
causation of a defendant’s established deficits in
adaptive behavior.

D. Clinical Judgment
Intellectual disability is a complex condition,
and an accurate clinical diagnostic process cannot be
limited to psychometric instruments alone.
Evaluating an individual who may have intellectual
disability involves more than technical details: the
clinical experts must also be given latitude to
exercise and explain the role of their professional

limitation than to some other circumstances such as cultural or
linguistic diversity or sensory limitation.”).
A central reason that the diagnostic criteria have never
included a requirement of demonstrating causation is that
clinicians have never possessed instruments or a scientifically
based methodology for ascertaining whether the one
phenomenon is caused by the other. As a result, there can be
no scientific basis for a court (or a witness) to reach a diagnostic
conclusion that a defendant’s deficits in adaptive functioning
were caused by the existence of a mental illness (rather than
having been caused by the deficits in intellectual functioning).
Such a conclusion is scientifically unsupported and
unsupportable. Placing the burden of proof on an intellectually
impaired individual to demonstrate that his adaptive deficits
were caused by his intellectual impairment would require him
to prove the unprovable.

25
judgment27 in reaching their conclusions.28 Under
professional standards, diagnosticians are not free to
replace the requirements of the clinical definition
It is
with their own impressionistic views.29
essential that the clinician’s judgment rests on an
empirical and fully documented assessment.30

Keith F. Widaman, Concepts of Measurement, in The
Death Penalty and Intellectual Disability 55, 59 (Edward A.
Polloway ed., 2015) (“[T]he need for clinical judgment to
combine all information to arrive at important diagnostic
decisions is always a component of this assessment task.”);
Robert L. Schalock & Ruth Luckasson, Clinical Judgment 7 (2d.
ed. 2014) (“The purpose of clinical judgment is to enhance the
quality, validity, and precision of the clinician’s decision or
recommendation
in
situations
related
to
diagnosis,
classification, and planning supports.”).

27

See also American Educational Research Association,
American Psychological Association, & National Council on
Measurement in Education, Standards for Educational and
Psychological Testing 164 (2014) (“Test score interpretation
requires professionally responsible judgment that is exercised
within the boundaries of knowledge and skill afforded by the
professional’s education, training, and supervised experience as
well as the context in which the assessment is being
performed.”); DSM-5, supra note 5, at 37 (“Clinical training and
judgment are required to interpret test results and assess
intellectual performance.”).
28

See Marc J. Tassé, Adaptive Behavior Assessment and
the Diagnosis of Mental Retardation in Capital Cases, 16
Applied Neuropsychology 114, 121 (2009) (“Hence, clinical
judgment should not be used as a shield when one draws
conclusions that are not supported by the assessment results,
observations, and/or case records.”).
29

This excludes, of
unscientific “observations.”
30

course,

impressionistic

and
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Diagnoses lack validity
principles are ignored.31

when

basic

scientific

Alternatively, an examiner might simply
conclude that the defendant “does not seem
mentally retarded,” independent of IQ score,
effort testing, and structured adaptive behavior
assessment. Such idiosyncratic methods and
intuitive observations have no normative
comparisons, have not been scientifically tested,
have no known reliability or validity, and reflect
unsystematic and potentially confirmatory
sampling bias.
Whatever their anecdotal
appeal, such methods lack scientific rigor and
are not appropriate expressions of clinical
judgment.
Macvaugh & Cunningham, supra note 11, at 155.
See American Psychological Association, Specialty
Guidelines for Forensic Psychology, 68 Am. Psychologist 7, 15
(2013) (“Forensic practitioners use assessment procedures in
the manner and for the purposes that are appropriate in light of
the research on or evidence of their usefulness and proper
application.”); American Psychological Association, Ethical
Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, 57 Am.
Psychologist 1060, 1064 (2002) (“Psychologists’ work is based
upon established scientific and professional knowledge of the
discipline.”) (Standard 2.04); see also Robert L. Schalock & Ruth
Luckasson, Clinical Judgment 15 (2d ed. 2014) (“Clinical
judgment is not . . . a vehicle for stereotypes or
prejudices . . . .”).
31
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II.

States Are Not Free to Ignore Accepted
Scientific Standards in Adjudicating
Cases Involving Intellectual Disability.

The scientific and clinical understanding of
intellectual disability is no less essential for the
adaptive behavior prong than it is for the intellectual
impairment prong. See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct.
1986, 2001 (2014) (The defendant must “have the
opportunity to present evidence of his intellectual
disability, including deficits in adaptive functioning
over his lifetime.”). And the scientific consensus
about the proper diagnostic standards regarding
deficits is as clear and as firmly established as the
consensus about measuring intellectual functioning.
As is the case in other fields, clinical science
advances with new discoveries and, more frequently,
with refined understanding of established principles.
Our clinical understanding of intellectual disability
is no exception. In implementing this Court’s ruling
in Atkins, lower courts must be free to consider
refinements
of
our
understanding
of
the
phenomenon, and cannot be commanded to blind
themselves to the advancements in the consensus of
scientists and clinicians. Clinical understanding
cannot, of course, be treated as if it were fixed in
amber, and any requirement for courts to willfully
blind their eyes to proven advances in scientific
understanding
is
inconsistent
with
basic
32
Constitutional principles.
See generally Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010)
(“[D]evelopments in psychology and brain science continue to
show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult
minds.”); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 n.5 (2012)
32
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But the larger constitutional issue presented
by this case is the choice by the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals to ignore scientific principles
altogether, even those that have been clearly
accepted and established for decades.33 The court
maintains that the Eighth Amendment protections of
Atkins apply only to a sub-set of defendants with
intellectual disability,34 and therefore it need not use
clinical standards.35
(“The evidence presented to us in these cases indicates that the
science and social science supporting Roper’s and Graham’s
conclusions have become even stronger.”).
As this Court noted in Hall, “[T]he legal determination
of intellectual disability is distinct from a medical diagnosis,
but it is informed by the medical community’s diagnostic
framework.” 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2000 (2014). Since the Texas
approach to the second prong is supported by virtually no
clinical authority, it can hardly be seen as “informed by the
medical community’s diagnostic framework.”

33

Remarkably, the Court of Criminal Appeals offers, as
part of its justification for the consideration for nonclinical
factors, the suggestion that this Court’s finding of a national
consensus against executing individuals with intellectual
disability might not be controlling. It speculates about whether
“[there is] a national or Texas consensus that all of those
persons whom the mental health profession might diagnose as
meeting the criteria for mental retardation are automatically
less morally culpable than those who just barely miss meeting
those criteria?” Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2004) (emphasis added). It also suggests that this
narrower protected group who satisfy the Texas consensus may
be defined by their “level and degree of mental retardation.” Id.
While this Court invited the States to devise procedures for the
adjudication of intellectual disability cases, Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002), it has never suggested that any State
is authorized to reduce the group of individuals entitled to
Eighth Amendment protection because of a perceived consensus
34
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As an additional part of its effort to limit the
reach of Atkins, Texas instructs its courts to evaluate
defendants using a list of characteristics that it
deems incompatible with a diagnosis of intellectual
disability. See Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8–9
(Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The list of so-called “factors”
consists primarily of stereotypes and supposed
in that State. See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1999 (“If the States were
to have complete autonomy to define intellectual disability as
they wished, the Court’s decision in Atkins could become a
nullity, and the Eighth Amendment’s protection of human
dignity would not become reality.”).
In the opinion below, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals rejected the clinical standard for the diagnosis of
intellectual disability for Atkins purposes. It explained that, in
its view, there are two different definitions of adaptive
behavior, one “[f]or purposes of the Eighth Amendment,” and
the other from clinical organizations “for purposes of making a
clinical diagnosis of intellectual disability.” Ex parte Moore, 470
S.W.3d 481, 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). The court elaborated
on its differing standards theory stating that “[i]n the Eighth
Amendment context,” applicants must satisfy more than the
first two prongs of the clinical definition, they must also prove
causation between them by showing that “adaptive behavior
deficits are related to significantly sub-average general
intellectual functioning rather than some other cause.” Id.
(The “other” causes about which the court speculated in this
case included childhood abuse-related trauma and learning
disability.) Id. at 526. Finally, the court stated that it had
chosen to disregard the testimony of the defendant’s experts
because they “appear to have applied a more demanding
standard to the issue of adaptive behavior than we have
contemplated for Eighth Amendment purposes.” Id. at 525.
Specifically it took issue with the fact that the experts had
complied with accepted clinical standards by refusing to
consider stereotypes, isolated strengths, and testimony about
prison behavior in their assessment. See id.
35
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strengths, such as planning ability, responding
rationally, and dissembling.36 This approach violates
the established diagnostic principle that the second
prong of the definition focuses solely on deficits
rather than isolated strengths or abilities.
Distorting the definition with invented
exclusionary factors is fundamentally inconsistent
with the clinical understanding of intellectual
disability, and has no support in the scientific and
clinical literature in the field.37 It has been rejected
by scholars and practitioners who study and work

The Court of Criminal Appeals maintains that the
Briseno factors do not replace the clinical definition, but rather
merely supplement or augment it. See, e.g., Ex parte Sosa, 364
S.W.3d 889, 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“While we did not
make consideration of any or all of these factors mandatory,
they reflected our concern that the AAIDD’s guidelines should
not be considered in isolation, but rather in the context of the
concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in Atkins.”). The
Texas court’s expressed concern is that the clinical definition of
the second prong is too “subjective,” and that its invented
factors are “more objective.” See Ex parte Cathey, 451 S.W.3d 1,
11 n.22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). However, there appear to be no
cases in which the court uses its factors to expand the group of
individuals who satisfy the second prong, but abundant
examples where they are used to restrict it to a sub-set of those
who satisfy the clinical definition. It has instructed lower
courts by reversing at least one decision that used the clinical
definition, and ordered reconsideration in light of the factors.
Sosa, 364 S.W.3d at 890.
36

Notably, Texas uses the clinical definition of intellectual
disability for all legal purposes other than those involving the
death penalty. See, e.g., Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.
§ 593.005 (West 2010 & Supp. 2016).
37
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with people with intellectual disability.38 Each of the
Texas court’s factors is individually problematic
because none is based upon clinical understanding of
However, the more
intellectual disability.39
See, e.g., Macvaugh & Cunningham, supra note 11, at
136 (“The seven criteria of the Briseno opinion operationalize
an Atkins interpretation that only exempts a subcategory of
persons with mental retardation from execution.”); Caroline
Everington, Challenges of Conveying Intellectual Disabilities to
Judge and Jury, 23 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 467, 481 (2014)
(“Using these seven factors as part of a diagnosis has the
potential (if strictly interpreted) to exclude anyone functioning
in the mild ID range from the protection of Atkins.”).
38

Dr. Everington’s concern about the exclusion from
Atkins protection of individuals with “mild” ID (who constitute
the vast majority of capital defendants with intellectual
disability) seems fully borne out by the Court of Criminal
Appeals’ observation about whether the Briseno factors align
with the clinical definition. See, e.g., Sosa, 364 S.W.3d at 892.
The almost exclusive focus of the Texas factors is on
purported strengths or abilities of the individual, rather than
deficits. In addition, the first factor, whether others viewed the
individual as having mental retardation, see Briseno, 135
S.W.3d at 8, relies on whatever stereotypes that particular lay
informant may have held about what “mental retardation”
meant and looked like. But the Texas factor that is most
obviously at odds with the clinical literature concerning the
diagnosis of intellectual disability is the final one in the list:
whether the facts of the crime were consistent with a diagnosis
of mental retardation. In addition to their potentially
prejudicial effect, see generally Fed. R. Evid. 403, the facts of
the crime have no relevance to deficits, and this approach has
been rejected by clinical experts. See, e.g., Macvaugh &
Cunningham, supra note 11, at 169 (“Evaluators are
discouraged from utilizing criminal behavior to ascertain the
presence or absence of deficits in adaptive functioning.”);
American Association on Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities, User’s Guide: Intellectual Disability: Definition,
39
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fundamental problem is that both the apparent goal,
and the actual effect, of reducing the number of
defendants entitled to the Constitution’s protection
are inconsistent with this Court’s teachings.
The Texas re-formulation of the definition’s
second prong bears little resemblance to the
professional definition’s clear focus on deficits in
adaptive behavior. This approach is inconsistent
with accepted diagnostic standards and practices.

As this Court has observed, “Not all people
who claim to be mentally retarded will be so
impaired as to fall within the range of mentally
retarded offenders about whom there is a national
consensus.” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317
(2002). But every capital defendant who may have
intellectual disability should have the relevant
evidence evaluated according to scientifically
accepted standards.
Texas’ invention and adoption of a list of
unscientific criteria for adaptive functioning has the
Classification, and Systems of Supports 18 (2012) (“Distinguish
between adaptive behavior and problem behavior(s). They are
independent constructs and not opposite poles of a continuum.
Information regarding problem behavior does not inform the
clinician regarding the person’s adaptive behavior.”); id. at 20
(“Do not use past criminal behavior or verbal behavior to infer
level of adaptive behavior. . . . The diagnosis of ID is not based
on the person’s ‘street smarts’, behavior in jail or prison, or
‘criminal adaptive functioning.’”).

33
effect (and, apparently, the purpose) of limiting the
protection of Atkins to a sub-set of those defendants
who satisfy the clinical definition of intellectual
disability.40 This is incompatible with the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of Cruel and Unusual
Punishments.
Amici believe that the basic framework of the
clinical definition is the constitutionally required
standard for determining whether a defendant has
intellectual disability.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, amici urge this
Court to reverse the judgment of the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals.
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See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563–64 (2005) (In
Atkins, “the Court ruled that the death penalty constitutes an
excessive sanction for the entire category of mentally retarded
offenders.”).
40

